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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
“Aesop, who used animals to illustrate human foibles, told of the 
eagle that died from an arrow, the shaft of which had been feathered with 
one of its own plumes, to make the point that ‘We often give our enemies 
the means of our own destruction.’ ”1 
 
Information technology has made possible some of the most astonishing 
achievements in the history of the modern world.  Its usefulness has paved the way for its 
introduction into nearly every facet of society to the point that we are now inescapably 
dependent upon it.  The ironic fact that that which gives us a significant edge over our 
adversaries also carries within it one of our most ominous vulnerabilities is now widely 
accepted and has resulted in an effort known as Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP).  
Information security plays an important role in CIP but one significant threat that has 
been ignored for nearly twenty years is the threat of information system subversion.  
System subversion involves the clandestine and methodical undermining of a system by 
planting artifices (trap doors) in it that bypass its security controls.  This method of attack 
is the choice of the professional attacker (such as a nation state or a large company 
engaging in corporate espionage) who gains access at some point in the system lifecycle 
and plants the artifice.  This artifice grants only those with knowledge of both its 
presence and how to trigger it, virtually undetectable and potentially unrestricted access 
to the system.  The professional attacker is motivated by the prospect of significant 
payoff that may not be realized until several years in the future – often at a time when the 
victim’s dependence upon the proper functioning of the system is crucial. 
Perhaps the closest relative to subversion is the Trojan Horse attack in which the 
attacker sends the victim a program in the hopes that the victim will run it on his system.  
When he does so, the program covertly performs some additional malicious function.  
There are three primary factors that distinguish this from subversion.  First, the Trojan 
Horse requires a legitimate user to run it while the artifice in subversion does not.  
Second, the Trojan Horse program exploits the level of privilege associated with the 
individual that runs it whereas the artifice (typically embedded in the system) simply 
                                                 
1 From Grant, P. & Riche, R. (1983).  The Eagle’s Own Plume. Proceeding of the U. S. Naval 
Institute, July, 1983. 
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bypasses these privilege checking controls.  Finally, the artifice in subversion typically 
has some type of activation and deactivation mechanism. 
Recent trends indicate recognition of the importance of assurance in information 
systems, but none of the commonly available commercial systems or solutions even 
approach the level of assurance required to address the subversion threat.  Firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems, encryption, and other similar defense layers all fail in the 
face of subversion.  Moreover, methods used to assess the security of systems such as 
security test and evaluation (ST&E), red teams (tiger teams), and penetration testing are 
unable to protect against this threat.  The only known way to protect against the 
subversion threat is with high assurance systems that offer verifiable protection.  This is 
not the type of assurance being associated with the majority of modern commercial “high 
assurance” systems, but the type found in systems designed formally and evaluated 
through formal audits of the system against a sound set of criteria.  Systems built in such 
a way offer the unique ability to verify that the security mechanisms are both sound and 
complete even after they have been built. 
Press reports over the past year provide ample evidence that the means, motive, 
and opportunity for an attack of this nature exist.  Certainly, decision makers could be 
considered negligent if they ignore the threat of subversion in systems upon which the 
defense and critical infrastructure of the United States depend.  The computer security 
community understood the subversion threat as early as the 1970’s and by the mid 
1980’s, vendors were building systems with assurances to defend against it.  However, 
these systems saw little application (even in the Department of Defense) as the society 
was not yet so inescapably dependent on information technology, the threat was not so 
mature, and there were strong pressures to use products of the commercial market that 
favored functionality and features over security and assurance.  There has been very little 
work in this area since this time. 
This thesis demonstrates that it is relatively easy to subvert a system (given access 
at some point during its lifecycle) in a way that can cause significant harm and includes 
two example artifices (one of which is implemented).  Finally, it points out that lessons 
learned in designing systems to withstand subversion are in danger of being lost and 
proposes a project to educate and train a new generation of security professionals. 
 xii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this paper is to heighten awareness of the threat of system 
subversion and demonstrate that, unless this threat is addressed where appropriate, the 
responsibility to provide proper security cannot adequately be met.  To this end, a brief 
examination of the threat is provided followed by several real world and publicly 
reported incidents that together demonstrate the means, motive, and opportunity for an 
adversary to conduct this type of attack against the United States.  Finally, a working 
example of a subverted operating system is constructed by placing an artifice in the 
kernel.  The effect that this might have on the larger system is demonstrated in the form 
of a Network File Server, which will allow the attacker who has knowledge of the artifice 
full access to the server. 
The security problem is unique and difficult. It involves proving not only the 
presence of proper functional security controls, but also proving the absence of anything 
that can undermine these controls.  After-the-fact testing and certification cannot provide 
the level of protection require to counter subversion.  The only way to counter this threat 
is to build systems in such a way that the insertion of an artifice is both detectable and is 
guaranteed to be discovered during formal audits of the system against a sound set of 
criteria.  This approach will be presented following the examples. 
B. DEFINITION 
Meyers (1980) defines subversion of a computer system as “… the covert and 
methodical undermining of internal and external controls over a system lifetime to allow 
unauthorized or undetected access to system resources and/or information.”  At the time 
of this writing, an increase in reliance on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) automated 
data processing systems was cited as cause for concern over the protection of information 
of varying degrees of sensitivity in the presence of multiple users with varying levels of 
trustworthiness.  The contemporaneous solution to this “classical security problem” was 
the security kernel – a small analyzable portion of a trusted operating system that was 
protected and responsible for enforcing security policy on the system.  It was noted that 
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unless the threat of subversion was addressed, this security kernel technology could never 
hope to provide a solution to the security problem. 
The environment has changed significantly since 1980.  In many ways, Meyers 
foretold the environment that exists today.  Products are vastly more complex and 
interrelated making it much easier to hide artifices (Anderson, 1972).  Systems (such as 
web servers) now provide simultaneous service to large numbers of completely unknown 
and untrusted users.  Reliance on information technology (IT) has skyrocketed - every 
individual and almost every aspect of modern life are affected by computers in some way 
even if not in a direct relationship.  There is so much that must be considered when 
building a system that it is easy to overlook the most fundamental issues.   
For instance, lessons had been learned in the early 1970’s that no ad hoc fix or 
security patch could provide security if the operating system could not be trusted 
(Anderson, 1972 and Schell, Downey, and Popek, 1973).  While it is uncommon today 
for a vendor to be foolish enough to claim a silver bullet solution, there are a significant 
number of these ad hoc security products available to throw at the problem.  One can 
easily be lulled into a false sense of security by employing an assortment of products in a 
so-called “layered defense.”  However, the lessons of the past must not be forgotten.  
High assurance systems (i.e. systems with “verifiable protection”) are the only known 
technology that can address the threat of subversion and subversion is a threat that 
deserves attention. 
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The focus of concern in the field of computer and information security has 
meandered through a seemingly infinite list of threats.  In the beginning, computers ran a 
single program and the threat could be addressed with physical controls.  Operating 
systems brought capabilities to reduce the time that these expensive machines stood idle 
by enabling them to share resources and run several programs “simultaneously.”   
Protecting data and resources became a much more difficult problem in these shared-use 




... The nature of shared-use multilevel computer security systems presents 
to a malicious user a unique opportunity for attempting to subvert through 
programming the mechanism upon which security depends (i.e., the 
control of the computer vested in the operating system)…The threat that a 
single user of a system operating as a hostile agent can simply modify an 
operating system to by-pass or suspend security controls, and the fact that 
the operating system controlling the computer application(s) is developed 
outside of USAF control, contribute to the reluctance to certify (i.e., be 
convinced) that contemporary systems are secure or even can be secured. 
The security kernel was offered as a proposed solution by providing domain 
separation and addressing the issues of object reuse, covert channels, and other avenues 
of attack on confidentiality and integrity that resulted from this development.  Anderson 
(1972) describes the security kernel as follows:   
The objective for a security kernel design is to integrate in one part of an 
operating system all security related functions.  This is for the purpose of 
being able to protect all parts of the security mechanism, and to apply 
certification techniques to the design. 
This report also introduced the concept of the Reference Monitor (RM) the function of 
which is to validate that all references made by subjects (active entities in the system) to 
objects (passive entities) are authorized for the specific mode of access requested.  In 
other words, whenever a process requests access of a particular mode (e.g. read/write) the 
RM must validate that the subject is authorized to reference the object in that mode.  The 
report introduced the term Reference Validation Mechanism (RVM) as the 
implementation of the concept and stipulated the following three enduring requirements: 
• The RVM must be tamper proof; 
• The RVM must always be invoked; and 
• The RVM must be small enough to be the subject of analysis and tests to 
assure that it is correct. 
The RVM would be one component of the security kernel.   
In 1979, Air University Review published an article (Schell, 1979), which 
presented evidence of weaknesses in the security controls of contemporaneous systems 
that were assumed to be secure by operators.  The author compared the use of these 
systems under the false assumption that they were secure to Japan and Germany’s 
confidence that their encryption systems could not be broken in World War II.   
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In the 1980’s, the DoD conducted more studies to address the computer security 
problem.  In 1983, “The Eagle’s Own Plume” (Grant and Riche), illustrated the threat in 
the context of the increased use of electronics and computers in Naval Weapon’s systems.  
The article provided hypothetical examples of how artifices inserted into weapons or 
weapon support systems by U.S. adversaries might cause failed communications and 
erroneous presentation of information and how this could negatively impact a conflict 
scenario.  At approximately the same time, criteria for evaluating the security assurances 
of computer systems were being developed.  These criteria were published in 1985 in the 
Department of Defense Trusted Computer Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) or “Orange 
Book” (DOD 5200.28-STD, 1985).  The RVM discussed above was incorporated into the 
criteria beginning at Division B (Mandatory Protection).  Subsequent work resulted in an 
entire series of publications (commonly called the “Rainbow Series”) which extended the 
criteria for application to networks and databases and amplified various aspects of 
functional and assurance requirements. 
Increasingly, systems were linked together into networks and ultimately the 
Internet in the 1990’s.  With the Internet in particular, the number and sources of threats 
soared as hardware decreased in cost, the pace of software product development 
accelerated, and the number of users with the ability to connect within the network 
increased.  To counter these new threats, cryptography, intrusion detection systems, 
virtual private networks, and firewalls took the forefront as the must-have tools for 
protecting information systems.   
The end of this cycle appears to be nowhere in sight; new technologies and 
products constantly emerge to address the new threats that appear in the rear-view mirror 
only to be followed by yet another newly discovered vulnerability or exploitation 
technique.  The recent creation of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) List 
(http://www.cve.org) is testament to the magnitude of the problem – vulnerabilities are so 
prevalent, that a vulnerability taxonomy and management system is required just for the 
security community to communicate effectively about the problem. 
Yet, with all this attention to computer and network security, with all the various 
security technology available today, the threat of subversion remains unchecked and 
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largely ignored.  These new technologies simply cannot counter the threat of subversion.  
Loscocco, et al (1998) provide excellent examples of how these technologies fail to 
provide protection when it is falsely assumed that the underlying system is secure.  It is 
not the case that we do not know how to address this threat.  In fact, since the early 
1970’s, we have had available technology and procedures that, if applied properly, will 
eliminate the most serious threats of subversion.  These will be discussed later. 
D. THE PROFESSIONAL ATTACKER 
Subversion is the technique of choice for the professional attacker.  In order to 
fully understand the subversion threat and appreciate why it deserves attention, the 
distinction between the professional and amateur attacker must be understood.  The 
professional attacker is distinguished from the amateur by objectives, resources, access, 
and time.   He is very concerned about avoiding detection and this will therefore be one 
of his primary objectives.  Amateur attackers are often motivated by a desire for notoriety 
or simple curiosity as much as for gaining access.  The problem for them becomes 
maintaining selective anonymity relative to the observers – allowing some observers to 
attribute the attack to them while denying the same ability to law enforcement or other 
authorities.   
The professional will often be well funded and have adequate resources to 
research and test the attack in a closed environment to make its execution flawless.  A 
flawless attack will attract less attention than one that must be mounted numerous times 
due to errors or bugs. 
As described by Meyers (1980), the professional attacker is one who understands 
the system lifecycle.  Using this knowledge, he may construct a subverted environment 
by controlling the efforts of a development team without the individuals realizing that 
they are involved in the subversion activity.  In a large system with complex 
dependencies between modules (as is common in today’s operating systems) the 
opportunities for this approach are clearly evident.  
Coordinated attacks are also the mark of a professional.  These types of attacks 
are launched from multiple systems simultaneously at a single target and can achieve a 
big pay-off in a short period of time.  They also complicate efforts to discover the origin 
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of the attack, helping to conceal the identity of the attacker.  The distributed denial of 
service (DDOS) attacks in which large numbers of vulnerable system are used by an 
attacker as “zombie” platforms to attack a common target, while not a professional 
attack, illustrate this concept. 
Finally, the professional is willing to invest a significant amount of time in both 
the development of the artifice as well as its use – possibly waiting years before reaping 
the benefits of the act of subversion.  This final characteristic demonstrates another facet 
of the professional attack.  The subverter (who plants the artifice) may be – in fact, 
usually will be - a different individual than the attacker.  In this scenario an attacker may 
have paid someone else to perform the subversion and will at some point in the future, 
activate the artifice and attack the system.  The artifice may be designed in a general 
enough way that an arbitrary attack is possible. 
An important note is that skill level is an independent consideration.  The 
professional does not necessarily possess more skill than the amateur attacker.  As will be 
shown by the example in this paper, the technical skill level required to plant an artifice 
may be comparable to anyone with a basic ability to understand and write code.   
E. CONTRAST WITH OTHER ATTACK METHODS 
Meyers (1980) classifies attacks into three categories:  Inadvertent Disclosure, 
Penetration, and Subversion.  This taxonomy is presented with the assumption that the 
goal of each attack is bypassing system controls for the purpose of unauthorized 
disclosure of information.  Distinctions are made between them based on the skill level of 
the attacker and the level of control he has on the system under attack.  Inadvertent 
disclosures predominantly result from accidentally occurring states in the system or 
simply when a human error allows unauthorized entities the ability to observe 
information in an unintended way.  Penetration is a more deliberate attempt to exploit a 
flaw that already exists in the system to bypass security controls.  The penetrator must be 
content with working under the constraints imposed upon him by a system over which he 
has no control.  He will exploit bugs or other types of flaws to bypass or disable security 
mechanisms on the system.  In contrast, the subverter is skilled and knowledgeable and 
has sufficient access to the system at one or more points in its life cycle to exert influence 
on its design, implementation, distribution, installation, and/or production in a way that 
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can be later used to bypass the protection mechanisms.  He will not rely on the presence 
of an accidental bug in the system (which may be corrected at any time), but will favor 
instead a carefully hidden mechanism that he can be relatively sure will persist through 
new product versions and upgrades. 
The distinction between the so-called Trojan Horse and an artifice as used in 
system subversion is important to understand.  The Trojan Horse is a piece of software 
that provides two distinct functions.  One is observable and is a function that entices an 
individual to use the software.  The other function is hidden and carries out the malicious 
intentions of its designer.  Implicit in this description is that the Trojan Horse requires 
actions (but not the active cooperation) of a legitimate user on the system.  It will 
therefore be constrained by the level of access that this user has on the system.  With this 
technique, system security mechanisms are still in place and functioning properly – the 
attacker’s code is executed with a surrogate’s permissions.  If the surrogate has a 
restricted domain of control, the Trojan Horse software will be limited in its utility to the 
attacker.  Subversion on the other hand, does not require action by a legitimate user.  It 
simply bypasses any security mechanisms that the subverter chooses to bypass.   
Additionally, an artifice will typically include the capability to be remotely 
activated and deactivated.  The normal state for the artifice is deactivated.  In this way, 
the artifice is less likely to be observed by the users and operators of the system.  The 
mechanism that activates the artifice waits for some unique trigger to exist in the system.  
Examples are a particular stack state, an unlikely sequence of system calls or signals, or 
codes hidden in unused portions of data structures passed into the kernel via system calls.  
The possibilities are endless.  This trigger can be thought of as a key that can be made 
arbitrarily long from a cryptographic standpoint.  Other examples from Grant and Richie 
(1983) include triggers such as geographic position or keywords observed in messages 
processed by communication systems.  As a result, no amount of security test and 
evaluation (ST&E) can confirm the presence or absence of the artifice.  This will be 
explored later in Chapter VI.  “Limiting the Risk of Subversion in Information Systems.” 
Brinkley and Schell (1994) classify misuse techniques similarly into human error, 
user abuse of authority, direct probing, probing with malicious software, direct 
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penetration, and subversion of security mechanism.  In this taxonomy, subversion stands 
apart as well for the same reasons described above. 
F. WHY DECISION MAKERS SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE 
THREAT OF SUBVERSION 
That subversion is a threat is even truer today than it was in the past.  The sheer 
size and complexity of today’s systems alone make the insertion and hiding of an artifice 
much easier than it was at the time of Meyers’ thesis.  Additionally, design and 
development efforts are more divided among many individuals or departments which 
makes it possible to divide the artifice into separate modules further obscuring its true 
nature.   
As the market for information technology gradually shifted from the government 
and military to the private sector, the government’s ability to keep pace with industry 
diminished.   For the government to continue developing systems in-house would hinder 
its ability to do business with private industry.  As a result, the government shifted to the 
use of commercial products and in so doing resigned itself to accepting whatever 
direction products were taken by the larger market forces.  It is now clearly evident that 
security was unimportant to the broader market and therefore had little impact on an IT 
company’s bottom line.  As competition among vendors increased, the pressure to release 
products by deadlines intensified.  As a result, a subverter may stand a better chance of 
getting his artifice through quality control (if it is noticeable at all) in the rush to get the 
product to market.  This is the environment in which the products we rely upon for our 
information technology needs are developed. 
One does not need to look far to find reports of security critical bugs and system 
intrusions that could just as easily been the result of subversion as error.  Recent press 
reports illustrate the opportunity and motive to conduct a subversive attack in the 
Microsoft Windows operating system.  As this is a major vendor with a tremendous 
market share, any such subversive attack would have far reaching impact.  During the 
month of October 2000, an individual gained access to systems at Microsoft and had 
access to the source code for a future release of the Windows operating system and 
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Office Suite2.  The company of course dismissed the possibility that the code was 
tampered with, but it would be impossible to provide any real level of assurance that this 
is true.  In January 2001, Verisign Corporation (http://www.verisign.com) erroneously 
issued Microsoft certificates to individuals who falsely claimed to be Microsoft 
employees3.  As a result, these individuals had the opportunity to publish code that would 
appear to be certified by Microsoft Corporation.  Hence, many users (even 
administrators) might associate a false level of trust with malicious software (operating 
system upgrades, etc.) written by these individuals.  On Dec 17, 2001, shortly after the 
United States’ war on terrorism began, Newsbytes reported4 on claims by a captured 
member of the Al Qaeda regime in Afghanistan that members of a terrorist organization 
had infiltrated the Microsoft Corporation as programmers for the expressed purpose of 
subverting the Windows XP operating system.  While there was a lack of corroborating 
reports, this indicates that subversion is considered as a valid attack technique. 
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that both opportunity and motive exist 
for carrying out a subversive attack.  By the example presented later in this paper, one 
may conclude that the means to mount such an attack would not be hard to attain.  
Therefore, in order to fulfill the responsibility to protect information systems, decision 
makers should be aware of this threat and consider its significance in all deployments of 
information technology.  Certainly, decision makers could be considered negligent if 
subversion is ignored in a wide range of military systems or in the systems upon which 
the critical infrastructure of the United States Depends. 
G. OUTLINE 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Chapter II.  “High Level 
Discussion of the Network File Server (NFS) Experiment” describes the experiment from 
a high level, covering the goals and objectives and how these affected the design of the 
artifice.   
                                                 
2 See http://money.cnn.com/2000/10/27/technology/microsoft/ 
3 See http://www.verisign.com/developer/notice/authenticode/ 
4 See http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/173039.html 
 9 
Chapter III.  “High Level Discussion of SSL Subversion” describes an attack, 
which was not implemented in this project, by which an attacker can observe the SSL 
encrypted network communications between two systems with little to no risk of being 
discovered.  It is shown that no amount of assurance on the server side alone can prevent 
such an occurrence if the client is subverted. 
Chapter IV. “Detailed Description of the NFS Example” describes the 
implementation of the NFS experiment in detail. 
Chapter V.  “Evaluating System Security in the Face of Artifices” debunks the 
prospect of discovering the presence of artifices or proving their absence in a system after 
it has been developed either through  code inspection or by security test and evaluation. 
Chapter VI.  “Limiting the Risk of Subversion in Information Systems” presents 
the only known solution for eliminating the threat of subversion. 
Chapter VII.  “Conclusions and Future Work” ties all of these points together and 
proposes future direction to address the threat of subversion. 
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II. HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSION OF THE NETWORK FILE 
SERVER (NFS) EXPERIMENT 
A. HIGH LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. General 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to highlight the risk of the threat posed to an 
information system by a professional attacker mounting a subversion attack.    A 
demonstration of a working example was decided to be the best option for making this 
point.  To achieve maximum impact, not only did an artifice need to be constructed, but a 
full demonstration of an attack had to be developed as well.  As a result, the experiment 
diverges from a true reflection of the professional attack in several respects.  First, there 
were significant restrictions on the time available to construct the artifice.  This would 
rarely be the case in a well crafted artifice such as might be constructed by a professional 
attacker (e.g. a nation-state, organized crime group, or company engaged in corporate 
espionage).  Second, the author was free to openly plant the artifice and did not need to 
be concerned that his actions might be discovered.  Obfuscation of the artifice was not 
given serious attention.  In a professional attack, obfuscation would be of the utmost 
importance and would add to the time required.  Finally, there was essentially no long-
term motivation in the development of this attack.  The professional would be motivated 
by the prospect of a very significant payoff potentially far in the future while the author 
was motivated by a short-term payoff goal.  In spite of these constraints, this experiment 
demonstrates the inability of contemporary approaches (such as application level 
security, encryption, security test and evaluation (ST&E), and perimeter defenses) to 
provide for security against subversion.   
2. Selecting the Method of Subversion and the Target System 
Subversion may occur at any point in the lifecycle of a system (Meyers, 1980).  
However, since access to the lifecycle of a major operating system is quite limited for a 
student, the installation and maintenance phases present greater opportunity for insertion 
of an artifice.  Also, in the case of open source systems, a distribution phase attack could 
be mounted.  Several Linux vendors offer no-cost versions of their operating system for 
download from their websites.  MD5 hashes of the CDROM images are posted to provide 
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customers with the ability to check the integrity of the downloaded images.  Often, third 
parties provide mirror sites to reduce the load on a single server, which opens the 
possibility for a malicious mirror site offering subverted versions of the software. 
For the reasons stated above, the Linux operating system was chosen as the 
platform on which to build the demonstration.  The availability of source code and the 
abundance of documentation make the Linux kernel fit well into the constraints of the 
experiment.   
Choosing an open source operating system for this experiment runs the risk that 
some readers will be lead to believe that closed source products are immune to the attack 
as demonstrated.  While it is arguably more difficult, the task is not particularly daunting 
for the professional attacker described above.  As this example is carried out late in the 
lifecycle of the product, there would be significantly more work involved in subverting a 
closed source product.  Planting an artifice during the distribution or installation phase 
would involve reverse engineering the application and creating a binary patch to insert 
the artifice at the appropriate location in the product binaries.  However, during the 
earlier phases of the lifecycle, the level of difficulty from a programming standpoint is 
the same for both closed and open source products.  Then there is the question of access.  
Here again, the professional is one who will either have the access or have the resources 
to obtain it regardless of the open or proprietary nature of the system. 
3. Selecting a Suitable Attack Demonstration 
In order to achieve the desired impact, an attack had to be selected such that its 
significance was readily apparent to the average observer.  Moreover, the activation 
mechanism needed to be commonly available and understood.  To this end, the author 
chose a Network File Server (NFS) as the application on which to demonstrate the attack.   
The file server is general enough and common enough that the typical user of information 
technology will immediately understand its function as well as the notion that one user’s 
data should be protected in some way from access by other users who lack permission to 
do so.  A demonstration in which an attacker is able to obtain access to information 
which he should not have should be comprehendible to readers with diverse levels of 
technical sophistication. 
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Likewise, the activation must be fairly straightforward.  After investigating 
several options, the author settled on using the network interface for activation.  Again, 
network communications are easily explainable to most audiences.  They are also 
ubiquitous enough that the activation interface will likely be available on any target 
system as well.  The Internet is one of the most widely used technologies available today.  
For an overview of the aspects of Internet networking that apply to the following 
discussion, see the APPENDIX. 
The specific form of activation in this experiment involves sending a malformed 
packet, which contains some additional information to the target.  The target’s 
networking implementation (having been subverted) will drop the malformed packed as it 
normally would, but in addition would recognize the packet as being a trigger to activate 
the artifice that will then grant the attacker access.  Hence, the artifice on any system 
connected to a network can be activated remotely from any other system connected on 
the same network (e.g. the Internet, Wide Area Network or Local Area Network).   
Additionally, the artifice can be activated locally by sending the activation packed to the 
host’s loopback address (an address that loops back to the sender of the packet). 
For the reader who does not have the opportunity to observe a demonstration of 
the NFS example, the attack (shown in Figure 1.) proceeds as follows.  A client is shown 
to have the file system of a remote network file server mounted locally.  The 
demonstrator shows how he is denied permission to access a certain portion of the file 
system.  An activation packet is sent to the subverted server.  Then the demonstrator 
shows how he subsequently has access to read, write, and modify file objects on the 
server.  Finally, a packet is sent to deactivate the artifice and the normal functioning of 
the system is confirmed by showing a denied attempt to access another user’s file or 
directory on the server. 
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B. ARTIFICE DESIGN AND INTEGRATION INTO THE OPERATING 
SYSTEM 
The purpose of the artifice used in this example is to provide a means to bypass 
file permission checks for a specified user at will and then to re-enable the normal system 
operation.  The Linux kernel uses a virtual file system that abstracts all of the various 
types of files systems and devices into a logical, consistent interface.   
The example presented here shows how a few lines of code can result in a 
significant vulnerability.  It exhibits all of the characteristics of subversion except that no 
real attempt has been made to hide or obfuscate the artifice.  First, the artifice is small.  In 
all, eleven statements in the C programming language are needed for this example.  This 
small size in relation to the millions of lines of code in the Linux Kernel makes it highly 
unlikely that any but those involved in the development of the kernel would notice. The 
artifice itself is composed of two parts located in two unrelated areas of the kernel.  
A second characteristic is that it can be activated and deactivated.  As a result, the 
functionality exists only when the attacker wills it.  This will further complicate any 
attempt to discover the existence of the artifice.  Unlike some Trojan Horse attacks, there 
will be no suspicious processes running on the system.  Even when activated, the 
functionality is embedded in the kernel and not in a user-space process so its 
observability is limited.  Under these conditions, no amount of testing is likely to show 
the presence or absence of a well-hidden artifice. 
Finally, it does not depend on the activities of any user on the system.  The 
attacker can activate and deactivate the artifice at will as long as the system will process 
IP packets.  He is therefore not subject to any permission constraints of a particular user 
on the system.  Moreover, the fact that all users and administrators of the system may be 
trusted (for example in an environment where all users are cleared to the same level and 
the system is operated in system-high mode), has no effect on the attacker’s ability to 
exploit the system.  Administrators make the system vulnerable simply by connecting it 
to a network.5 
                                                 
5 A closed system can be vulnerable as well by using triggers based on other conditions in the system 
such as geographic position, system load, etc. For examples, see Grant and Riche (1983). 
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 1. Artifice Function 
The artifice in this example subverts the Linux file system permission checks.  
When in the activated state, the artifice grants the attacker access to any file on the 
system by causing the file permission check in the kernel to be bypassed.  This behavior 
is limited to a specific user ID that the attacker specifies at activation time.  The system 
functions normally for all other users. In fact, the attacker can even use a userID that is 
unused (i.e. one for which no account exists) on the target system.  Activation and 
deactivation is accomplished by sending a single User Datagram Packet (UDP) to the 
target system.  The portion of the kernel that receives network communications has also 
been subverted to recognize a packet that has a distinguishing characteristic (a trigger 
known only to those involved in the subversion and the attack) that activates and 
deactivates the artifice in the file system.  The trigger can be made to be arbitrarily 
unique to avoid not only accidental activation and deactivation, but also make it difficult 
to guess the activation code (this will be discussed in greater detail later). 
The operation of the file permission check mechanism in the subverted system is 
shown in Figure 2.  The comparisons that are made in the decision branches reference a 
global variable in the kernel.  Since the variable is global, any portion of the kernel can 
have access to this value.  Global variables are used quite often in the Linux kernel. 
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Permission Check requested on a 
file system object 
Is Artifice 
Activated? 
Proceed with normal 
permission test 









Access Permission Granted 
Yes 
 
Figure 2.   File Permission Checks in a Subverted System 
 
The artifices’ global variables are set and cleared in the activation and 
deactivation mechanism.  This occurs in the portion of the kernel that implement the 
network protocol stack.  In the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), 
headers contain checksum values to ensure integrity of the received data.  The example 
uses a User Datagram Packet (UDP) to activate and deactivate the artifice.  In the UDP 
handling code of the kernel, every UDP packet is tested for an invalid checksum.  If one 
is detected, control passes to a portion of the kernel that logs an error and drops the 
packet (removes it from the list of packets in the queue).  In the subverted kernel, the 
checksum error code looks for some predefined unique values.  If this condition is met, it 
sets the artifice state to “On” and the user who is to receive privilege to the value in the 
source port field of the UDP packet.  This control flow is shown graphically in Figure 3.   
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UDP packet with bad checksum 
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Proceed with log and 
drop packet process 
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packet and store this in global 
variable representing the user to 
have privileged access. 
 
Figure 3.   Artifice Activation 
 
Deactivation occurs the same way except that the global variables are set so that 
the artifice is deactivated and the system returns to its original operation. 
C. THE SUBVERTED SYSTEM IN OPERATION 
A system subverted in this way is vulnerable simply by connecting it to a network 
that can be reached by the attacker.  In fact, the only action required on the part of an 
administrator of the NFS system is to connect it.  Furthermore, the only action he can 
take to deny access to the attacker is to disconnect it (making it useless as an NFS server).  
While it is true that there are additional measures that can be taken to enhance the 
security of NFS over the configuration used here, they are largely ineffective, as the 
subverter would simply bypass these security controls as well.  For example, NFS servers 
register clients that are permitted to use them.  If the attacker works from one of these 
machines, the attack is trivial.  If the attacker does not have access to one of these 
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machines, he merely needs to be in a position to observe traffic on the network and spoof 
his identity as that of a legitimate NFS client. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We have described an example of subversion, which is simple but effective for 
illustrating the risk of subversion.  While it is possible to secure an NFS server in ways 
that will render this artifice ineffective, to dwell on such details would distract from the 
point.  The main point here is that any protection mechanism can be rendered ineffective 
by modifying it so that the protection mechanism is bypassed.  With the risk that the 
artifice can be planted in the kernel, no application layer security solution can be counted 
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III. HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSION OF SSL SUBVERSION 
As a second example, a high level discussion is presented here of a subverted 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).  SSL is commonly used to provide secure communications 
between web servers and web clients (browsers) so that internet banking transactions and 
credit card purchases for web commerce applications are protected from unauthorized 
observation or modification.  The client and server negotiate session keys that are used to 
encrypt traffic between them using some symmetric encryption algorithm.  Linux systems 
commonly use OpenSSL (http://www.openssl.org) to implement SSL.  The Apache Web 
Server6 (http://www.apache.org) has a mod_ssl package available that acts as an interface 
between the web server and OpenSSL.   Therefore the Apache web server relies on 
OpenSSL to perform the encryption and decryption of the web traffic. 
A. OVERVIEW OF A POSSIBLE SSL SUBVERSION 
SSL works in the following manner.  The client and server use symmetric session 
keys to encrypt and decrypt traffic sent between them.  The session keys are generated by 
the sender and then encrypted with either a secret shared by both systems or by using 
some public/private key asymmetric encryption.  When the encrypted session key is 
received, it is decrypted by the receiving system and then used to decrypt the data 
received from the sender.  There are a number of options available to the attacker for 
subverting this mechanism.  The most obvious is to simply duplicate all communications 
in an unencrypted form and send them to a system of the attacker’s choosing.  This 
option might cause far too much observable system activity to be considered viable by 
the professional attacker.  Another option could be to weaken the key generation 
mechanism by limiting the amount of entropy used to generate random numbers.  The 
attacker could then capture the network transmissions and the task of “breaking the code” 
would be sufficiently constrained so as to make it computationally practical. 
A much better option than either of these two would be to simply have one of the 
systems participating in the communication send the session keys out in an unencrypted 
form.  The attacker could then position himself between the two systems, gather the 
                                                 
6 According to the Netcraft Survey (http://www.netcraft.com/survey), over 65% of the active web 
servers in February 2002 were running the Apache web server. 
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encrypted traffic and at the same time, watch for the session keys.  Having both, he could 
then decrypt and read the data.  Due to the fact that the session keys are unknown on 
either system outside of the SSL implementation, plus the fact that they are a ‘random’ 
sequence of bits, it is unlikely that any observation of them would lead to the conclusion 
that they are keys that have recently been used to encrypt SSL traffic.  As an added 
precaution however, the session keys could be transmitted in a way that draws little 
attention to the fact that they are being sent as described below.   
Web communications use Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which has 
provisions to guarantee the connection’s integrity.  One of the ways it does this is by 
providing sequence numbers in each packet.  The sequence numbers give the receiver the 
ability to ensure that it received all of the packets (by checking for a missing number in 
the sequence) as well as to put the packets back together in the correct order.   In much 
the same way that the trigger is set in the NFS example, the session keys could be 
embedded in a packet that has an invalid checksum.  The receiver would therefore ignore 
and drop the packet.  Since the checksum is bad, the receiver would normally request that 
the sender retransmit it.  However, the artifice would simply cause the packet to be 
dropped silently in this case.  The logging of the bad packet could be bypassed as well.  
To the attacker eavesdropping on the communication, these packets would be tested for a 
characteristic chosen by the attacker to indicate the presence of the session key.   In order 
to know which data packets are associated with which key, the artifice could reuse one of 
the legitimate TCP sequence numbers that was used to transmit the SSL encrypted data.   
This approach has some distinct advantages.  First, the attacker can be totally 
passive and maintain anonymity.  No packet needs to be sent to him directly by either 
system.  Another advantage is that a subverted system on either end would provide all 
required information for decrypting the traffic.  This is significant in that it invalidates 
any assumption that using high assurance systems or additional security products at the 
server end only will protect the data stored at the server.  Since both ends must use the 
same session keys, any client that is permitted to access the server can potentially 
undermine the security in place on the server end.   
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For instance, one might provide additional protection of the server’s private keys 
by storing them on a smart card.  With this design, the session keys are decrypted on the 
smart card, which adds some level of protection over decrypting the keys on the host 
operating system since the private key is not exposed.  However, the computationally 
intensive decryption of the traffic is most often performed off of the card due to smart 
card processor and I/O limitations.  As a result, the session key (once decrypted on the 
smart card) will be sent to the host (i.e. server) system’s SSL implementation that will 
then use it to decrypt the traffic.  If the server’s SSL implementation has been subverted 
to send the session key to the attacker, the presence of the smart card is irrelevant to the 
level of confidentiality realized.  Additionally, since the same session key is used on both 
the server and client sides, the security is only as strong as the weaker of the two sides.  
The client may just as effectively transmit the keys as the server.7 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We have provided an additional high-level discussion of a potential subversion of 
SSL, which is relied upon for protecting confidential communications on the internet.  In 
this example, subversion of either the web server or the web client can result in a 
compromise of this communication.  As proposed here, placing the artifice in the SSL  
implementation will affect not only web traffic, but also any application that relies on 
SSL.  We have also presented a case against investing significant amounts of resources in 
placing strong security measures at the server side only.  Before making such an 












                                                 
7 This is not to imply that every component in the network must be high assurance. Architectures such 
as those presented in Weissman (1992) and Fellows, et. al. (1987) provide sufficient security at both the 
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IV. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE NFS EXAMPLE 
The details of the example are presented here for those who are interested.  The 
discussion begins with a description of the normal functioning of file permission checks.  
It must be remembered however, that the details of what happens in these tests were 
rendered totally irrelevant in the experiment.  None of these details matter since the 
artifice simply bypasses the permission checks.   
A. LINUX IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW 
Linux implements a Virtual File System (VFS), which is a software layer in the 
kernel that abstracts the system calls for various types of file systems into a single 
common interface.  The VFS provides access to disk-based filesystems (Unix, ext2, MS-
DOS, VFAT, etc) and special filesystems (/proc and /dev).  In addition, VFS sits 
above the implementations for several network files systems such as the Network File 
Server (NFS), Coda, SMB (Microsoft’s Windows and IBM’s OS/2 LAN Manager), and 
Novell’s NetWare Core Protocol (NCP).   A diagram of this relationship is shown below 




… MS-DOS NTFS /dev NFS 
File System Calls 
 
Figure 4.   The Linux Virtual File System 
File object access permissions in Linux are implemented using the standard Unix 
file permission bits for read, write, and execute as granted to owner, group and others.  
All requests for access to a file flow through the function permission() located in the 
kernel source file fs/namei.c.  The file’s inode structure is first checked for a 
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pointer to a file system-specific permission() function.  If there is none, 
permission() calls the vfs_permission() function.  Permission bits are 
checked against the user specified in the current process’ task_struct (defined in 
include/linux/sched.h) which is stored in the process descriptor in the kernel-
space stack as shown in Figure 5.  below.  The file system user ID  (fsuid) is used by 
this function in the tests for permissions.  Having a separate file system userID (fsuid) 
enables the kernel to handle requests from a process that is acting on behalf of another 
process without modifying the normal uid or effective user ID (euid) which may be 
root or 0.  The permission() function returns a zero if the permission test succeeds 













Figure 5.   The Process Kernel Stack (From Bovet & Cesati, 2001) 
 
1. Artifice Implementation 
The VFS system is an attractive location for the artifice since it can affect 
numerous file systems types.  Simply returning a zero from the permission() 
function will result in approval of the requested access.  This alone, however, is far too 
general, as all users on the system will be granted access to any file.  To avoid such 
obvious behavior, a mechanism must be built through which a particular user can be 
specified leaving all other users on the system subject to the normal permission checking.  
This functionality is implemented in the activation mechanism.  Any activation 
mechanism should be flexible enough to be used in a variety of situations and ubiquitous 
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enough that the attacker can be relatively sure it will be available on his target.  In 
meeting these design objectives, the networking protocol is a suitable location for the 
activation portion of the artifice. 
The portion of the artifice that grants access is located in the fs/namei.c 
source file of the Linux 2.4.3 kernel.  Two global variables, activated and userid, 
are used to store the state of the artifice (deactivated=0, activated=1) and the uid for 
which to grant access respectively.  Immediately upon entering the permission() 
function, a test is conducted by an ‘if’ statement that evaluates (1) whether or not the 
artifice has been activated and (2) whether the process’ fsuid is equal to the global  
userid variable.  If so, the permission check returns success (access granted) regardless 
of the file permissions on the requested file.  Otherwise, the permission tests proceeds as 
normal. 
The activation and deactivation artifice is planted in the Linux 2.4.3 kernel source 
file net/ipv4/udp.c.  Any error detected in the checksum of a UPD header will 
result in execution branching to code that logs the event and silently discards the packet.  
The artifice is planted in the portion of code that provides this function.  The artifice is 
embodied in two ‘if’ statements.  The first statement activates the artifice.  It first 
checks to see that (1) the artifice has not already been activated and (2) whether or not the 
bad checksum matches the activation codes of decimal 213 or 2113 (chosen arbitrarily).  
If so, it activates the artifice by setting the global variable activated to 1 and the 
userid variable to the user ID that has been specified in the UDP source port.    
As designed in this example, activation proceeds in the following manner:  a UDP 
packet is constructed with the following characteristics: 
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 Field Value 
Checksum Invalid and equal to one of two 
predefined values (213 or 2113) 
Source Port The userID corresponding to the 
uid for which the attacker wishes 
to grant access. 
Destination port Irrelevant 
Table 1.   Activation Packet Characteristics 
 
Two predefined values (decimal 213 and 2113) for the checksum are used in the 
event that our ‘secret’ checksum (the activation code) turns out to be valid for the packet 
we construct.  In the normal kernel, a packet with a bad checksum would simply be 
discarded.  Since UDP is a stateless protocol, the packet will just be forgotten.  Since 
userIDs are commonly small numbers (most Linux implementations begin UIDs for 
normal users close to 500), these packets will appear to have originated from a privileged 
(<1024) port on the host and will more likely be permitted through a firewall than those 
with higher port numbers.  TCP could be used as well but would require a slightly more 
complex implementation.  Once a UDP packet with these characteristics has been 
received, the artifice will be in the activated state. 
Deactivation proceeds in a similar fashion.  A packet with the following 
characteristics is sent to the target host: 
Field Value 
Checksum Invalid and equal to one of two 
predefined values (312 or 3112) 
Source Port Equal to the current value stored in 
the userid variable 
Destination port Irrelevant 
Table 2.   Deactivation Packet Characteristics 
 
When a packet with these characteristics is processed, the artifice will set the 
activated variable to zero which deactivates the artifice.   
There are a few things worth pointing out about this artifice.  First, it gives the 
subverter even more power with respect to the file system than the root user has.  Even 
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files for which the root user does not have current access8 will be available to the 
attacker.  Second, not only can this attack can be mounted remotely via any network path 
available, but it can also be launched locally by sending the activation and deactivation 
packets to the localhost (127.0.0.1) address. 
2. The Network File Server as a Target   
The Network File Server (NFS) allows a remote file system to be mounted locally 
and appear as though it were located on a local disk drive.  NFS runs on top of the RPC 
protocol and uses AUTH_SYS as its default security mechanism.  AUTH_SYS is a weak 
security protocol but is common in NFS implementations.  In this protocol, the standard 
set of user credentials (the UID and associated Group ID’s) are used for determining 
access.  Every NFS request will contain these credentials.  When a request comes into the 
server, the NFS Daemon maps the uid of the requestor into the fsuid of the NFS 
daemon process.  After some initial checks, the request will be passed through the VFS 
and into the permission() function.  As specified earlier, the access request will be 
evaluated based on the fsuid. 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We have provided the details of the NFS subversion example.  While the 
implementation is small (about 11 C language statements), the fact that it is in the source 
code listing makes it vulnerable to detection.  Again, obfuscation was not one of the goals 
of this project.  Given more time, the artifice could be hidden much better.  The critical 
observation is that the technical skills required to subvert a system are relatively 
commonplace. 
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V. EVALUATING SYSTEM SECURITY IN THE FACE OF 
ARTIFICES 
As stated earlier, no real attempt was made to hide the artifice in the Network File 
Server example.  In contrast, the professional attacker will most definitely spend 
significant effort on this aspect of the attack.  This section will begin with a discussion of 
the various techniques that might be employed to hide an artifice followed by a 
discussion of the ways in which an artifice might be detected.  Apart from catching the 
subverter in the act of subversion, discovering the presence of a particular artifice can be 
made extremely difficult.   
A. TECHNIQUES FOR FINDING AN ARTIFICE 
The manner in which one may find an artifice depends upon the way in which it 
was hidden and the point in the product lifecycle when the subversion occurred. 
1. Design and Implementation Phase Subversion 
Meyers (1980) describes several examples of artifices that could be implemented 
in a system’s design phase.  Design phase subversion has the least chance of being 
“patched” away.  Of course the artifice will be visible at some level in the design 
documentation but there is ample opportunity for a subverter to propose to a design team 
a seemingly sound alternative that offers subtle vulnerabilities.  One subtle example can 
be found in asymmetric encryption protocols which is discussed below as an analogy.   
Jim Alves-Foss (1998) presented a very interesting example in the context of 
public-key based authentication protocols.  In this attack, an otherwise secure protocol is 
subverted in an indirect way by the existence of another independent protocol (possibly 
devised by an attacker) that is permitted to use the same key pair as the original protocol.  
By interleaving messages between the two protocols, the attacker can masquerade as a 
legitimate user to other entities.  He demonstrated how a Needham Schroeder Public Key 
Protocol (which had been hardened against a previously known attack) could be spoofed 
if it used the same keys that are used in another protocol designed for a different purpose.  
Hence a subverter developing an application that uses public key certificates could devise 
his own protocol (possibly secure enough for the new application) that provides the 
 31 
necessary pieces to masquerade as other entities in previously established protocols and 
applications. 
What makes this example of subversion interesting is its circuitous nature.  The 
target of the attack is not the authentication protocol but the public key infrastructure.  
The authentication protocol is not altered in any way by the subverter.  To accomplish his 
goal, the subverter merely needs to influence policy so that his new application and 
protocol is permitted to use the same keys as the existing ones.  
Such subtle interactions often occur accidentally and are discovered later with 
widespread use.  However, as stated earlier, the well-designed artifice will have some 
form of unique trigger mechanism to hide its presence in normal operation modes.  In this 
way accidental discovery from general use is nearly impossible. 
The artifice in the NFS example could potentially be inserted during the 
implementation phase of the system lifecycle.  In this mode of operation, the subverter 
will attempt to insert the artifice during the implementation or coding of the system.  He 
can accomplish this either by infiltrating the development team as an agent or by 
exploiting weaknesses at the development facility (either in its physical security or in its 
configuration management system). 
In a given system, the subverter often has a vast number of options for hiding an 
artifice.  The use of low level languages such as assembly (common in the Linux kernel 
to enhance speed) can be used to code the artifice in a way that make understanding its 
nature difficult.  For example, in the Linux operating system, every process acts on behalf 
of a user (possibly the system) who is identified by a userID stored in the process 
descriptor that the kernel maintains for each process.  When a process requests access to a 
file, the kernel checks the userID of the requestor by inspecting this data structure.  Since 
this data structure is used frequently and for many purposes, it must be fast.  Linux 
achieves speed in functions like this by using low-level assembly language to program 
them.  To keep the difficulty of writing the code at a minimum, a macro called current 
has been implemented that will return the starting address of the process descriptor 
belonging to the current process.  Individual members of the process descriptor (e.g. 
fsuid) are referenced relative to this base address.  Prior to compilation, every instance 
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of current in the source code will be replaced with the assembly language statements.  
So, one way to hide a portion of the NFS artifice, would be to replace the macro 
current with a modified version of the assembly code that would return the address of 
the fsuid data member rather that the beginning of the data structure.  It therefore 
would be less likely to be associated with the original macro’s function. 
Any artifice placed in the system’s source code is visible in the source listing.  A 
developer with understanding of the system of sufficient breadth and depth might 
discover the artifice through inspection.  This depends on how well the subverter has 
hidden it.  The subverter might also remove the artifice from the source listing after it has 
been compiled.  Another technique was presented in Ken Thompson’s 1984 Turing 
Award acceptance speech (Thompson, 1984).  In this speech, he described a subverted 
compiler that would recognize when it was compiling the UNIX source code and insert a 
trap door.  In this way, the trap door could not be discovered from inspection of the 
source code.  This speech sent shock waves through the audience at the time, but this 
technique was described more than a decade earlier in Karger and Schell (1974). 
2. Distribution, Maintenance, and Support 
With these attacks, the subverter can choose to affect all delivered systems or 
focus the artifice with respect to a particular target.  In these attacks, the system has been 
through testing for quality assurance and a binary has been produced that is ready to ship 
to customers.  The subverter gains access at some point in the distribution system.  He 
then modifies the system by applying a patch to the binaries or by replacing the binaries 
entirely.   
Similar methods are used in maintenance and support phases.  Most vendors have 
patches and updates available for download via the Internet.  Others ship them through 
the mail or send them with maintenance personnel.  This artifice is perhaps the easiest to 
find if a known good copy of the system can be obtained for a byte-by-byte comparison.  
The difficult task is establishing that you have a good copy.  Some measure of assurance 
is provided by digitally signing the binaries.  The vendor runs a cryptographic one-way 
hash function over the binaries and then signs it using a private key.  To confirm that the 
software has not been modified, the customer uses the vendor’s public key to verify the 
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signature.  In some cases, a GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) key may be posted on the 
website with the software.  GPG is an open source equivalent to Pretty Good Privacy 
(PGP).  The trust model of these schemes is such that each user determines whom to trust 
individually as contrasted with the model used in the commercial Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) and Department of Defense models in which a trusted root authority 
(e.g. the DoD, Verisign, etc.) binds identities to public keys and signs a certificate that 
provides this binding.  Providing the public keys through the same distribution channel as 
the software leaves customers with little reason to trust that the software, public keys, and 
hash values have not all been modified.  The PKI trust model has been compromised in 
the past as well as described in the Verisign certificates case in Section I.F. “Why 
Decision Makers Should Seriously Consider the Threat of Subversion.” 
B. PROVING THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF AN ARTIFICE 
The question to ask given an example of an artifice such as the one presented here 
is not “How can this artifice be found” but “How can one be sure that there are no 
artifices in the system?”  The answer to the first question is of little value.  The artifice 
presented here can be found since it appears in the source listing and two new global 
variables are present in the system.  It is also relatively overt in that it operates in a rather 
direct manner inside a security critical function.  However, without controls as described 
in Chapter VI. “Limiting the Risk of Subversion in Information Systems”, gaining the 
assurance that a system is free of artifices is an impossible task.  Two possible ways of 
“finding” an artifice once it has been planted have been suggested.  The use of these 
techniques to provide protection from a subversion attack are refuted below. 
1. Source Code Inspection Will Fail to Reveal an Artifice 
Having the system’s source code available will not give an inspector the ability to 
ensure that it is free of artifices.  As stated earlier, the professional will have hidden the 
artifice in a way that makes it exceedingly difficult if not impossible to identify by 
inspection of the source code.  In fact, it is possible for the subverter to plant an artifice in 
a way that it never appears in the source listing of the system, for example by subverting 
the compiler used in developing the system, or planting the artifice in the object or binary 
code directly.   
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Even without going to the trouble of subverting the compiler, the subverter can 
hide an artifice in a way that it is likely to never be found.  Today’s systems are much 
larger and more complex than ever before.   The more complex a system is, the harder it 
is to understand its overall function.  The attacker can use this fact to make his artifice 
hard to understand.  Programmers will often leave code alone if they do not understand 
what it does and it is not known to cause any problems in the system. 
2. Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) Will Fail to Reveal an Artifice 
Security tests and penetration testing are worthless tools for assuring that a system 
is free of artifices.  Any artifice that incorporates a well-designed trigger (one which is 
unique) will never be found because the testing will occur when the artifice is disabled.  
The function of the artifice will never be noticed through this type of testing.  Code 
testing involves testing for the documented features of the system to make sure they 
function properly.  It does not consider what other undocumented functions may exist in 
the system.  To do so by testing would require that all possible input be sent to all 
possible interfaces.  This exhaustive approach is infeasible if not impossible for most 
systems.   
An informal argument supporting this assertion can be made by comparing the 
task of finding an artifice to finding a software bug in a system.  It is an indisputable fact 
that certain bugs may appear in software that are particularly difficult to track down.  
These bugs may appear and disappear as a result of a rare combination of conditions in 
the system.  Finding them is exceedingly difficult.  Now imagine that a similar function is 
built intentionally.  The feature manifests itself only when a rare combination of system 
conditions exists and furthermore, it can be triggered to occur at the will of the attacker.  
If finding the source of such a condition that has manifested itself in a noticeable way is a 
hard problem, how much harder would it be to find one that will manifested itself only 
when triggered?  It would be impossible to devise a procedure to test for clandestine code 
that operates this way. 
Given a black box (i.e. one for which the internal operations are unknown), it is 
impossible to determine whether or not it contains an artifice.  As stated in Section A.1. 
of this chapter “Design and Implementation Phase Subversion,” the attacker can ensure 
that nothing more than a black box exists with respect to the artifice, for example by 
 35 
removing the artifice from the source listing after compilation or by modifying the 
compiler to perpetually insert it.  In this way, the source code for the artifice will cease to 
exist yet the functionality will remain in the system. 
Edsger Dijkstra provided a scenario of testing a 72-bit adder that illustrates the 
futility of using testing to determine whether or not an artifice exists in the system.   In 
this scenario, the tester is given a black box that adds two 72-bit values with carry9.  His 
task is to determine if the adder performs correctly for any given input.  He must be able 
to state one of two results: (1) the adder performs correctly for every possible input or (2) 
the adder does not perform correctly for every possible input.  If the result is (2), the 
tester must provide the input conditions (i.e. the two numbers) for which the adder fails.  
Obviously, the only way to complete this task under these conditions is to test all possible 
inputs and validate the output.  The number of inputs that would need to be tested is 272 X 
272 or 2144 possibilities.  Consider the strength of a 128 bit cryptographic key and the 
amount of work required to mount a brute force attack against it.  The work involved in 
cracking a 128-bit key pales in comparison to the work required to test all inputs to the 
adder.  Conducting this test is computationally infeasible. 
Compare this scenario to the task of determining whether or not an artifice exists 
in a system.  As stated earlier, the subverter can use an arbitrarily long value as the 
activation key.  Suppose the tester or certifier knows how to tell if the artifice is active as 
well as how to try guesses of the trigger value (i.e. he knows how to send an arbitrary 
value into the trigger mechanism).   This is essentially the same scenario as Dijkstra’s 72-
bit adder with carry problem.  Since the activation key can be made arbitrarily long, it is 
computationally infeasible (i.e. impossible) to test whether or not the artifice is present in 
the system.  Now, suppose the task is to test for the presence of an unknown artifice.  In 
this case, the tester does not know how to send in a guess at the key.  Even if he stumbled 
across it and somehow accidentally activates the artifice (though he would likely not 
realize he has done so), what would he look for in the system?  What does he test for after 
he makes an attempt at activation?  The problem space is now the product of key space, 
                                                 
9 A binary add with carry results in the following operations:  two ‘0’s added results in a ‘0’, a ‘1’ and 
a ‘0’ added results in a ‘1’.  Two ‘1’s added will result in a ‘0’ with a ‘1’ carried over as input to the add 
operation performed on the next higher order bit. 
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potential activation mechanisms, and artifice function.  The added difficulty of this task is 
obvious.  These testing arguments can be extended to cover so-called “active defenses” 
built upon the use of intelligent agents or network monitoring to ensure system self-
protection, or to the use of cryptographic techniques for system protection.  Thease are 
worthless in the face of subversion. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The obvious conclusion from these examples is that no amount of code review or 
ST&E can provide even the most basic level of assurance that a system is free of 
artifices.  How then can one ever have enough confidence in an information system to use 
it for critical applications?  This question will be addressed in Chapter VI “Limiting the 
















VI. LIMITING THE RISK OF SUBVERSION IN INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 
It is impossible to protect information in a system that contains an effective 
artifice since the mechanisms relied upon to provide protection have been “programmed 
to fail” under specific conditions.  If it is impossible to prove by inspection or testing that 
a system is free of artifices and effectively impossible to find a known artifice after the 
system has been built, how can one ever obtain a level of assurance that would protect us 
from system subversion?  To answer this question, we must return to the conditions that 
make it possible for subversion to exist as a threat in the first place.  In the end, we 
present a viable solution to the subversion threat. 
A. ANALYZING THE THREAT MODEL 
We have shown that subversion is a real threat due to the existence of means, 
motive, and opportunity to conduct subversive attacks in the current environment.  
Specifically, we have shown that opportunity and motive to mount such an attack exist 
through presentation of real-world events covered in the press.  We have demonstrated by 
an example of a simple attack that the means to plant an artifice is present in anyone with 
a modest understanding of the target system and intermediate programming skills. 
So, to counter the threat of subversion, we must eliminate at least one of the three 
conditions that make it possible.  Obviously, it would be impossible to reduce or 
eliminate the subverter’s means to subvert the system.  The skills required to carry out 
this type of attack are far too common today.  Eliminating the motive is likewise a 
loosing proposition.  To do so, one must either reduce the benefit of mounting the attack 
or raise the cost of the attack to the point that it becomes prohibitive.  Since subversion 
bypasses the security controls of the system, the attacker gains at least as much benefit 
from it as do legitimate users.  Therefore, reducing the benefit for the attacker would 
reduce the benefit to legitimate users in equal measure.  Recall that subversion is the 
choice of a professional attacker, who was characterized by a willingness to incur 
substantial costs in resources and time in the first place.  The professional attacker could 
easily come in the form of a nation state with virtually unlimited resources.  Attempting 
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to raise the costs would likely have limited effect on the motivation of a professional 
attacker.   
One might also attempt to reduce motive through deterrence.  Laws combined 
with a strong law enforcement system discourage bad societal behavior in this way.  
However, with system subversion, avoiding detection is the overriding concern of the 
attacker and one source of his willingness to incur significant costs.  Any hypothetical 
law enforcement effort would be mired in its inability to detect the activity.  In fact, in 
some of the early demonstrations by Air Force tiger teams in the early 1970’s, some 
artifices were so undetectable, that the system manufacturer was unable to locate them 
even when told of their presence and given details on how they worked (Brinkley and 
Schell, 1995).  Moreover, the source of the attack is equally liable to come from outside 
the jurisdiction of law enforcement as it is to come from within.  System subversion is a 
type of attack that would be considered by a nation state (or state-sponsored 
organization), organized crime group, or large corporation involved in corporate 
espionage.  Therefore, laws would likely have little to no effect on deterring this threat 
due to jurisdictional limitations and difficulties in establishing attribution. 
We are left then with the task of reducing or eliminating any opportunity to 
subvert the system.  At one level, this involves denying the subverter access to the system 
at all phases in its lifecycle.  Physical security of the development environment, 
background checks for employees and protected distribution and upgrade channels 
provide some measure of defense at this level.  However, these measures alone are not 
sufficient to provide assurance that subversion has not occurred in a system.  Espionage 
cases have shown that we cannot solely rely on background checks and security 
clearances.  To do so in the context of system subversion would require us to be certain 
of the trustworthiness of all of the many individuals involved in the design, development, 
maintenance, etc. of a system over the course of its entire lifecycle.  Some other control 
or controls must be put in place such that it would be impossible for the subverter to 




B. SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, OBEJCT-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING 
(OOP), AND DEVELOPMENTAL ASSURANCE APPROACHES 
Software engineering has gained significant ground as a discipline since the time 
that subversion was first discussed.  It attempts to provide a sound methodology for 
carefully breaking a system down into highly cohesive modules and reduce the amount of 
reckless programming that occurs within software projects.  OOP languages have made 
this task easier by providing language constructs that enable software reuse as well as 
data hiding and encapsulation.  However, while these measures admittedly bring 
tremendous benefit to system development, they do not guarantee secure systems.  Parnas 
(1972) provides two modularized designs for the same hypothetical system to 
demonstrate good and bad examples of modularization.   
Likewise, development assurance approaches such as the System Security 
Engineering – Capability and Maturity Model (SSE-CMM http://www.sse-cmm.org) 
attempt to address the problem by enhancing the quality of the system that produces the 
software.  The following quote is extracted from the SSE-CMM Vision statement 
(available at http://www.sse-cmm.org/vision.htm)  
The SSE-CMM, applied to the entire life cycle of products and systems, 
will maximize synergy between life cycle phases, minimize effort within 
each phase, eliminate duplication of effort, and result in more secure 
solutions, with greater assurance and at much lower cost. 
These are certainly desirable qualities for any development effort.  However, as in 
most of the quality-driven models, the SSE-CMM cannot reliably address the threat of 
subversion because the model assumes that all members of the team share the goal of 
producing secure software.  If a subverter is operating covertly on the development team, 
the model breaks down.   
C. VERIFIABLE PROTECTION 
As stated earlier, we have known for a long time how to build systems in a way 
that allows us to convince ourselves that it is free of artifices.  The highest assurance 
rating (TCSEC A1) is based on criteria that address these issues.  However, we must be 
careful in the use of the term high assurance as there are many vendors making this claim 
of products that simply do not come close to these standards.  The line between the 
colloquial use of the terms high, medium and low assurance are vague and the terms are 
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easily tossed about in product sales literature and at demonstration booths for nearly 
every product aimed at security.  What are required are systems that not only meet sound 
security criteria, but that are also built in such a way that we can verify the protection 
mechanisms they provide.  Accordingly, we shall use the term verifiable protection from 
the TCSEC (DoD 5200.28-STD) to describe a system that is resilient to subversion.  We 
will discuss verifiable protection in detail in the following sections. 
Take for example the 72-bit adder with carry example (see Section V.B.2 
“Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) Will Fail to Reveal an Artifice”).  Dijkstra used 
this example to illustrate the absurdity of building a 72-bit adder with carry as a 
monolithic piece of hardware.  In practice, designers would build this device by 
constructing 72 one-bit adders with carry and then linking them together properly.  Then, 
testing of the entire system amounts to checking each of the 72 individual components for 
proper handling of the four possible inputs and properly passing any overflow condition 
to the next higher order component.  From this perspective, the system has been reduced 
to modules that can be completely tested.  As a result, the operation of the device as a 
whole has become verifiable and we can claim with high assurance that it will properly 
handle every possible input without actually testing every possible input. 
The simplicity of this example may leave the reader with doubts that such an 
approach can scale to a large information system.  A slightly more complex example is 
presented in Dijkstra (1968).  In the design of the “THE”-Multiprogramming System (a 
small operating system), he showed that “…it is possible to design a refined 
multiprogramming system in such a way that its logical soundness can be proved a priori 
and its implementation can admit exhaustive testing.”  The THE system and the 72-bit 
adder example are alike in that to test the THE system (or any general purpose computer) 
at the system interface with no knowledge of how it was constructed would require 
feeding all possible programs into the system.  He goes on to state that testing must only 
involve what is relevant and what is relevant can be decided only if the internal structure 
of the system is known.  The fact that the set of relevant test cases was small enough to 
be exhaustively tested was a result of the modular nature of the design.  In the context of 
our problem, recall that one requirement of the Reference Monitor Concept (Section I.C.  
“Historical Background”), is that security kernel design must be small enough to be the 
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subject of analysis and tests to assure that it is correct.  The exhaustive testing of the 
security kernel should be possible if it is built with a modular architecture. 
1. Properties of Verifiable Protection 
A system offering verifiable protection will provide a high assurance that its 
security properties are correct, complete, and allow nothing beyond their specification.  
Additionally, it will have the following properties: 
• Designed to have no exploitable security flaws 
• Enforce security policies on information flow, thereby bounding 
the damage of malicious software (e.g., Trojan Horses). 
• Built to be subject to third party inspection and analysis to confirm 
the protections are correct, complete and do nothing more than 
advertised (i.e., no trap doors). 
One of the primary risks that is addressed by verifiable protection is the risk that trap 
doors may be present which give an attacker the ability to bypass the system’s normal 
security controls.  As stated earlier, the entire system cannot be considered verifiable.  
The size and complexity of the typical system today prohibit such an undertaking.  The 
properties of the system that must be verifiable should be limited to the interface at the 
Reference Validation Mechanism (RVM)  (or the boundary of the security kernel). 
There must be a formal model describing these properties, which can be 
mathematically proven to be sound and correct.  An example of such a model is the Bell-
LaPadula access control policy model (Bell and LaPadula, 1975).  With verifiable 
protection, all of the operations at the boundary of the RVM must correspond to one or 
more rules that represent the security policy.  Figure 6.  shows the work that must be 
performed in building a system that provides verifiable protection.  The formal model 
describes the security policy.  This is mapped to a Formal Top Level Specification 
(FTLS) which is mathematically proven to be sound.  The mapping continues down to 
any engineering specifications and down through the implementation of the hardware and 
software through code correspondence.  Finally, the executable code (binaries) are shown 
to map to the source code by analysis of the tools used to generate them.  Once this 
correspondence has been shown, the soundness and correctness of the system’s security 



















Figure 6.   Correspondence of Security Policy to Implementation (After NCSC-TG-010) 
 
A system designed in this way will eliminate any opportunity for the attacker to 
plant his artifice as any function that does not relate back to the policy model will be 
discovered in the correspondence mapping. 
2. Requirements for Verifiable Protection 
In order to obtain verifiable protection in a system, it must not only be verifiable, 
but it also must be possible to audit the correct functioning of the system after the fact.  
The TCSEC (DoD 52100.28-STD) requires the following for a system to be verifiable 
and auditable: 
 
In order for a design and development to result in technology that is 
“verifiable” … it must include at least: 
• An information security policy 
• A formal mathematical model of the security policy 
• A formal top level specification (FTLS), having a precise syntax 
and well defined semantics, that accurately and completely 
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describes the boundary of the RVM in terms of exceptions, error 
messages and effects 
• A design that uses a complete, conceptually simple protection 
mechanism with precisely defined semantics 
• An implementation that makes effective use of abstraction, 
layering and information hiding.   
 
For a system’s security to be “auditable”, the development process 
provides evidence necessary for an effective after-the-fact security 
assessment including at least: 
• A formal proof that the FTLS implements the security policy 
model. Third parties can repeat such a proof.  This is in contrast to 
a descriptive top-level specification (DTLS), which would require 
third party participation in the design process to conclude the 
specification implements the model. 
• A mapping of all source code within the Reference Validation 
Mechanism (RVM) to the FTLS. It is the design process, 
particularly the production of a formal specification and a layered  
implementation that incorporates information hiding, that makes 
this possible.  This provides evidence that the implementation is 
free errors, including trap doors. 
• A demonstration that the implementation is consistent with the 
FTLS 
• Functional testing in which the advertised features of a system are 
tested for correct operation, and it is confirmed 
• An information flow analysis of the FTLS 
• Configuration management supporting a reliable rebuilding of the 
security mechanisms. This requires configuration management for 
hardware, software, firmware, formal specifications and all tools 
used to rebuild the system. There must exist a protected master 
copy of all material used to generate the RVM. 
• Trusted distribution allowing confirmation that a given instance of 
the security mechanisms matches an authoritative reference point 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We have shown that the only viable way to mitigate or eliminate the risk of 
subversion is by removing the opportunity that a would-be subverter might have to plant 
an artifice during all phases of the system lifecycle.  Through proper physical and other 
security controls, unauthorized individuals can be denied this opportunity to some extent.  
However, a much more practical and effective approach is verifiable protection.  This is 
the only way one can be sure that the system correctly and completely implements the 
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protection mechanisms and does nothing beyond its specification.  Furthermore, 
verifiable protection provides the ability to audit the system and ensure that a delivered 




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have shown that the risk of subversion is one that must be addressed in order 
to have any justification for trust in our information systems.  Decision makers 
responsible for security of information technology should consider this threat when 
deploying systems.  We have also shown that the current trends in approaches to 
“proving” security are inadequate at best.  Penetration tests, add-on third party products, 
layered defenses and security patches are largely accepted as a means to providing proper 
security – a practice known long ago to be irrational.  This results in a situation that may 
be even more dangerous than having poor security in the first place, as decision makers 
operate under the flawed belief that their system provides adequate security or that any 
breach will be discovered through layered defenses. 
We have also known for some time how to address the threat of subversion.  
Evaluation criteria tried and tested over the past 15 years have been applied to 
successfully provide appropriate security from a technological standpoint.  That these 
approaches have fallen into disfavor was foreshadowed in an early work by Karger and 
Schell (1973): 
We are confident that from the standpoint of technology there is a good 
chance for secure shared systems in the next few years.  However, from a 
practical standpoint the security problem will remain as long as 
manufacturers remain committed to current system architectures, produced 
without a firm requirement for security.  As long as there is support for ad 
hoc fixes and security packages for these inadequate designs, and as long 
as the illusory results of penetration teams are accepted as a demonstration 
of computer security, proper security will not be a reality.  
Much has changed since these early days of computer security.  The source of 
threats has multiplied significantly with the advent of the Internet.   Furthermore, our 
“…reliance on … technology is increasing much more quickly than our ability to deal 
with the also increasing threats to information security” (Landoll, Schaefer, and 
Williams, 1995).  We continue to nurture a vast industry that provides security as an 
afterthought in the form of add-on applications that offer little or no assurance.  We spend 
unquantifiable resources reacting to the latest known vulnerability by applying hastily 
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developed patches, which are tested predominantly by placing them in operation.  What 
we really need is assurance.  Not the assurance one hears about at trade shows or in 
product sales literature, but a verifiable level of protection, which offers not only 
protection from the amateur, everyday exploit but protection from the professional 
attacker as well.  As it has been attested throughout this paper, we have known how to 
offer this level of protection for more than thirty years.  However, these techniques have 
seen little application.  The few systems that were built were proprietary and lessons 
learned during their development and in evaluating them is largely undocumented.  
Knowledge of how to build such systems exists for the most part in a select few 
individuals who are now scattered among various other pursuits.  We must begin to look 
at these techniques again now - not only for the undeniable fact that the current security 
posture of the United States demands it, but also for the fact that if we do not begin soon, 
we may loose much of the costly knowledge we attained in those early years. 
Already, there are trends that indicate that this expertise is slipping away from the 
United States. Criteria-based security evaluations are now conducted against criteria 
specifications  written in the language of the Common Criteria for Information Security 
Evaluation (CC) (see http://www.commoncriteria.org).  Under the current scheme, a 
Mutual Recognition Arrangement exists between the United States, Canada, Great 
Britain, and other European member nations to recognize evaluations conducted at the 
lower assurance levels.  This was in part an effort to appease vendors who did not want to 
spend resources having their products evaluated multiple times in each nation.  However, 
inspection of the evaluated products list 
(http://www.commoncriteria.org/epl/ProductType/all.html) indicates that the majority of 
the evaluations above EAL4 are being conducted in Europe.   In fact, while the original 
mutual recognition arrangement extends up to and including Evaluated Assurance Level 
4 (EAL4), a set of the European nations have extended this arrangement between 
themselves, such that evaluations are recognized up to and including EAL7.10  Therefore, 
a vendor wishing to have a product certified at EAL7 will get more market recognition 
for the evaluation by having the evaluation conducted in Europe.  To obtain certification 
                                                 
10 See http://www.cesg.gov.uk/assurance/iacs/itsec/index.htm. 
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in the United States, he must complete a separate evaluation in one of the United States 
Labs. 
In an attempt to rescue the lessons learned in past high assurance development 
projects, the Naval Postgraduate School is embarking on an effort to develop an open 
source high assurance security kernel that offers verifiable protection.  This effort will be 
completely open to observation and participation and will hopefully result in an open 
source product made available to be used as the foundation for any product that can be 
built on top of it. 
 The time for this type of project is now.  We cannot afford to wait until a 
devastating attack occurs at which time, the corporate knowledge gained in the building 
of products that address the subversion threat may no longer exist.  It is critical that those 
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This appendix provides a basic introduction to Internet protocols to aid readers in 
understanding the subversion examples presented in Chapters II-IV. 
The Internet is one of the most widely used and widely understood forms of 
network communication.  It is often described as a massive “cloud” through which 
computers pass data to each other in the form of binary 1’s and 0’s modulated into an 
electrical signal.  The Internet uses pre-defined protocols to make communication on the 
Internet proceed smoothly.  The most common is the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), which defines how these connections get 
established, maintained, and torn down.  Data are passed around the network 
encapsulated in packets.  These packets contain the data (e-mail, documents, pictures, 
etc.) as well as information about the data (its origin, destination, size, etc.).  This data 
about the data or metadata are formed into well-defined headers.  Packets are sent from 
one computer to another along a path in the network.  Intelligent nodes analyze 
information contained in the header and decide where to send the packet next thus 
determining its path through the network.  Eventually, the packet arrives at a node that 
knows where the destination is and the path is complete.  This method of connecting one 
end to another is known as packet switching.  It is distinguished from circuit switching in 
which a physical end-to-end connection is built by electronic circuits and remains 
connected for the duration of the communication.  Circuit switching is the method used in 
telephone communications. 
The network protocols are organized into a hierarchical layering as shown in 
Figure 1. Layers of the TCP/IP Protocol.  An application (such as an e-mail program 
generates an e-mail message).  The data that comprise this message are formed in such a 
way that the e-mail program on the receiving side understands how to interpret the data 
and display the message.  Before the message can be sent out however, it must be formed 
into a packet.  So the e-mail program passes it down to the next layer which is either 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram Protocol (UDP).  The difference 
between TCP and UPD is not critical here, but this layer is responsible for defining which 
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application is responsible for the datagram portion of the packet and for guaranteeing that 
the information is received correctly.   The packet now contains the data generated by the 
e-mail program and the TCP or UDP header.  This then becomes the datagram for the 
next level down – the Internet Protocol IP layer, which will add the IP header.  The IP 
header contains, among other things, identifying information for the origin and 
destination computers.  After the IP layer is the Link Layer.  While the IP layer gets the 
packet from the origin to the ultimate destination, the link layer gets the packet from node 
to node.  Finally, the Physical Layer deals with the physical medium and how signals 
travel through it. 
A p p lic a tio n  T e ln e t, F T P , e -m a il,  e tc . 
T ra n s p o rt 
N e tw o rk  
L in k  
T C P , U D P  
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Figure 1.  Layers of the TCP/IP Protocol Suite (from Stevens, 1994) 
On the receiving end, the packet is passed up the stack in reverse order.  At each 
level, the header is stripped off and analyzed until the data is passed to the application 
(e.g. the e-mail program that will display the e-mail message).  As the packet is passed up 
this stack, it is checked for integrity (in the event that a glitch causes data modification) 
by comparing a filled-in the header called the checksum with the datagram portion of the 
packet.  If the checksum is invalid, the packet must be retransmitted (in the case of TCP), 
or just discarded and forgotten about (as in the case of UDP). 
The trigger in the NFS example (see Chapter II. “High Level Discussion of the 
Network File Server (NFS) Experiment”) is a UDP packet with an invalid checksum of a 
predefined value.  When a UDP packet with a bad checksum is received by the subverted 
system, it discards the packet normally, but also checks to see if the value in the 
checksum field is one of the predefined triggers.  If so, it triggers the artifice and then 
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